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Abstract
Worldwide income taxation in the country of residence is a legal dogma
of international taxation. We question this dogma from the perspective of
relations between developed and developing countries from a legal and eco-
nomic perspective, and make a modern and fair proposal for tax treaties.
We will show under which conditions a developing and a developed country
will voluntarily sign a tax treaty where information is exchanged truthfully
and whether they should share revenues. Moreover, we will demonstrate
how the conclusion of a tax treaty can assist in the implementation of a tax
audit system.
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1 Wither the worldwide income tax principle
Worldwide income taxation in the country of residence is a global legal dogma of
international taxation (see Mc Daniel (2007); Fleming et al. (2009)). Conceived to
fit relations between countries with symmetrical flows of capital, this dogma gradu-
ally spread throughout the world (see Christians (2010)). We question this dogma
from the perspective of relations between developed and developing countries for
two reasons. From a legal perspective, expanding the taxing sovereignty beyond
the national borders leads to overlaps with the sovereignty of the state of source
and international double taxation may arise. From a tax policy perspective, the
deduction of the foreign tax by the country of residence1, reduces the possibilities
of developing countries to attract foreign capital through tax policy. A reduction
of such tax by the country of source turns into a lower deduction against taxes due
in the country of residence. This achieves capital export tax neutrality, but elimi-
nates the possibility to reduce taxes by countries in order to attract foreign capital.
This paper regards this outcome in conflict with international tax justice and
a fair allocation of taxing powers (see Pistone & Goodspeed (2010)). In particu-
lar, in the presence of unidirectional flows of income or capital, as it is typically
the case for relations with developing countries, worldwide income taxation by the
country of residence allows capital exporting countries to link up to their taxing
jurisdiction income that has in fact been sourced or produced outside of it and thus
interfere with the tax policy decisions of the country in connection with whose ter-
ritory income was generated. The ambition of this paper is to present a solution
to replace the worldwide income tax principle. A modern view, that takes infor-
mation sharing seriously, is needed to make use of tax treaties as an instrument
for a fairer allocation of taxing powers and co-operation between developing and
1i.e. relief for juridical double taxation by the so-called foreign tax credit method.
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developed countries.
2 Legal interference in tax policies of developing
countries through tax treaties
The features of this policy can be summarized as follows: When - as it is often the
case - taxes levied in the developing country are lower than those applicable in the
developed country, the latter will in fact levy its own taxes on income produced
on the territory of the developing country under the noble justification that this
will discourage developing countries from negotiating a race to the bottom with
powerful multinational enterprises. (see Brooks (2007); Pistone (2010))
Remarkably,developing countries often abstain from compensating their more fa-
vorable domestic tax regimes. The even more remarkable effect of this international
scenario is that multinational enterprises are stimulated to invest in complex (and
expensive) international tax planning schemes in order to repatriate the invest-
ment of their capital through high tax jurisdictions that exempt foreign source
income and an appropriate use of the diversity of tax treaties around the world
(see Commission (2009)).
This paper aims at considering whether the allocation of taxing powers can be
reshaped in a way that allows the developing country to have a ”‘fair share”’ 2 of
the revenue originated from the exploitation of its territory (Benshalom (2010),
Brauner (2010), Brooks (2009)). The goal of the joint legal and economic analysis
is to secure for each developing country a sound and sustainable tax policy, based
on the certainty of financial resources, sourced within the same country, consis-
2To be defined below.
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tently with the national policy objectives of such country and without external
interferences (Brauner (2010), Christians (2010), Dagan (2010)).
From a legal perspective, states are free to decide whether or not to conclude
a tax treaty. However, if a treaty exists, the contracting states are obliged to
execute it in good faith, in compliance with the requirements of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties. Therefore, insofar as a treaty exists and includes
a clause on the exchange of information, the supply of information will be an
ordinary consequence of the obligation to execute the treaty in good faith. Never-
theless, some years ago the OECD has clarified that requests for information not
duly backed up by a precise documentation gathered in the framework of a pre-
liminary auditing activity are to be regarded as fishing expedition and thus do not
imply any obligation for the requested contracting state to supply the information.
From an economic perspective, information asymmetries as the one described
above, where a developing country will have information on firms of developed
countries can be solved by giving the developing country the right incentives to
share this information. These information sharing theories can be implemented in
tax treaties. In these theories information is considered a tradable good, and thus
revenue sharing inevitably will come alongside the exchange of information. Until
now such (economic) theories have found a limited attention among legal experts
of taxation.
Bacchetta & Espinosa (2000) have analyzed the problem of information sharing
for capital income taxation, demonstrating that information exchange can be sup-
ported only if governments interact repeatedly. Keen & Ligthart (2007) apply the
concept of information exchange to the EU savings directive. They compare a
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scenario without information exchange to a situation with the exchange of infor-
mation, where a country can unilaterally set a withholding tax to retain part of the
tax revenues. Whilst they do not explicitly state it in their paper, the model could
be used to analyze the benefits of signing a tax treaty with revenue sharing and
information exchange, and can thus be considered a special case of the analysis
carried out here.
The first empirical application that investigates the motives for countries to sign a
tax treaty has been carried out by Voget et al. (2011). They find that apart from
reducing or eliminating cross-border double taxation, tax treaties are also signed
to obtain a legal instrument for the exchange of tax information. In this respect,
this last paper provides evidence for the theory presented in this paper.
The current concern to move toward global fiscal transparency has increased the
general awareness of the importance to secure an effective exchange of informa-
tion through tax treaties. Therefore, regardless of whether tax treaties in fact
affect foreign direct investment, this study aims at establishing a fair and effective
exercise of the taxing sovereignty on the basis of tax treaties in relations with
developing countries through a mechanism that pursues an effective exchange of
information.Barthel et al. (2010)
The authors regard tax treaties as the only instrument through which developed
countries can obtain the sufficient and objectively reliable information to exercise
their sovereignty on revenue from developing countries (see Christians (2005)).
However, developing countries not necessarily dispose of the relevant infrastructure
and auditing system for supplying that information, which also entails substantial
costs for them. Furthermore, insofar as the tax treaty flow of information does not
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work properly, developed countries find themselves in a similar situation to that
arising in the absence of a tax treaty. Accordingly, for instance, they would be
unable to check whether transfer pricing within multinational groups effectively
corresponds to the function performed by companies in developing countries with
respect to income sourced in those countries. In such cases, firms may more easily
hide all or a part of their revenues.
3 Broad lines of a fair tax treaty with developing
countries
This paper elaborates a model that allows for an effective and sustainable exchange
of information in situations with unidirectional flows of income and capital, assum-
ing this as the situation most frequently occurring in relations with developing
countries. The analysis also takes into account the possible impact of an effective
exchange of information on the mobility of investment by multinational enterprises
at the international level, assuming two scenarios in which firms respectively (i)
can and (ii) cannot move to other developing countries.
The mechanism contemplated in this study allocates taxing powers in a way that
makes it affordable for developing countries to sustain the costs of an effective
auditing carried out at the standards required by global fiscal transparency (and
in certain cases even to introduce such a system of auditing) and exercise their tax
sovereignty in compliance with their own policy. The allocation of taxing powers
allows one contracting state (normally the developed country) to tax the income
up to arm’s length value and the other contracting state (normally the developing
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country) to tax the remaining part of the income3.
In the following, we will present the design for a modern and fair tax treaty. The
treaty is modern in the sense that it takes information sharing between contracting
states seriously. It is fair in the sense that it will comprise revenue sharing of tax
revenues collected by the developed country. We will assume that both contracting
states are small, and we can therefore treat tax rates as given. For the sake of
simplicity we assume that governments are Leviathan, and maximize government
revenues.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we will discuss the situa-
tion if firms are immobile. Though this scenario may not be realistic, it is simple
and yet permits us to show all the main results. We will relax this assumption
in section 5. Within each section, we will need to solve four distinguished cases,
depending on whether a treaty exists or not, and whether the developing coun-
try audits firms and gathers the necessary information for information sharing or
not. We will describe the benchmark case without a treaty in the first subsection.
Here we will assume that the developed country adopts the tax credit method,
and unilaterally allows full deduction of all tax payments to the developing state.4
In the second subsection, we will discuss the alternative case of a treaty, where
we assume that countries split the tax base according to the arm’s length trans-
fer pricing principle. In order to obtain information about its taxpayers from the
developing country, the developed country may be willing to share part of its tax
revenues, and we will indicate the range of revenue sharing where a tax treaty is
feasible.
3A good example of this is the predetermined mechanism currently applicable on a unilateral
basis for determining transfer pricing in the Brazilian tax system.
4This scenario covers the vast majority of all potential international tax cases
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4 The model economy without firm relocation
We consider n ∈ <+ identical multinational firms that produce a fixed quantity,
q, of a homogeneous good in a developing country U . We assume, for the ease ex-
position, that firms sell the q goods in a developed country D at a price pd ∈ <+.5
The sales price pd is constant and known to both countries. We will normalize
pd = 1.
Firms produce with constant marginal costs c˜i. These costs, by hypothesis, are
stochastic and unknown to both countries. For the sake of simplicity we assume
that each c˜i is a random variable which can assume two values: high
(
with prob-
ability ρ ∈ [0, 1]) or low (with probability (1 − ρ)), i.e. c˜i ∈ {cl, ch} 6. Note that
the developed country cannot observe the true realization of individual production
cost c˜i, but knows the probability ρ, so that it can foresee the number of firms
producing with a low and high marginal costs.
As quantity neither influences marginal costs nor the sales price, we will assume
that each firm produces exactly one unit of the good, q = 1 without loss of gener-
ality. Expected gross operating profits of firms are therefore given by 1− c, where
c = E(c˜i) = ρch + (1− ρ)cl. In the absence of a tax audit system, firms can claim
any reasonable cost to either country. 7
Both countries can and - in the absence of a tax treaty - will tax each firm i ’s
realized global gross profits 1 − c˜i. 8 We thus exclude headquarter shopping. Fi-
5We assume that consumers in D are immobile.
6with 0 < cl < ch < pd = 1.
7In our case, firms can claim at most costs of ch.
8For the sake of simplicity we assume that D can levy a corporate income tax on revenues in
D even in absence of a subsidiary.
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nally, we assume that there are no firms that produce in D and sell in U .
The developing country U can learn the actual realization of each firm’s c˜i bear-
ing a (sunk) cost M(n), with ∂M(.)/∂n > 0. We assume that there are fixed
costs of implanting a tax audit system, M(0) > 0. The developed country D
cannot observe or learn the true realization of c˜i and must therefore trust either
the firm or the developing country U ’s claim. In legal terms country U’s claim
can be dismissed for the absence of any legal obligation of country D to consider
it. However, country D may also find it unsatisfactory to passively import data
from the firms without being able to verify their true realization. This situation
has allowed international tax planning to make use of artificial structures and tax
driven schemes for several decades. This practice is judged highly undesirable in
the framework of global fiscal transparency, which is making considerable progress
with the support of the G20.
4.1 No Treaty
In the absence of a tax treaty and firm relocation, the developing country must
still decide whether to implement a tax audit system and thereby reveal informa-
tion about its resident firms, in particular about their true costs of production.
The developing country U will decide to audit if and only if tax revenues with
implementation of an audit system, that we denote with T nau , are (weakly) greater
than tax revenues without audit, T nnu ,
T nau = ntu(1− c)−M(n) ≥ ntu(1− ch) = T nnu (1)
where tu ∈ [0, 1] is the tax rate in country U . This condition is satisfied if and
only if audit costs are (weakly) inferior to the tax revenue gain. Formally,
M(n) ≤ ntu(ch − c¯) (2)
10
If no treaty is signed and therefore no information is exchanged, country D has to
rely on each firm i’s declaration about costs, irrespective of the implementation of
an audit system in the developing country U . From a legal perspective, this type of
information is generally considered of limited relevance, due to the low reliability
of data that cannot be cross-checked with tax authorities. A different conclusion
is generally only possible for publicly available information, such as for instance in
respect of data required for companies quoted on the stock exchange, or of facts
of common knowledge. In such circumstances courts generally acknowledge the
right of country D to apply disproportionate measures to prevent the occurrence
of abusive practices (i.e. tax avoidance and evasion).9
Since the developed country D does not have the necessary information and
no way to procure it, all firms will declare high costs i.e. ci = ch ∀i ∈ n and will
deduct taxes payed in country U that depends on the implementation decision of
country U .
In the absence of a tax audit system in the developing country, both countries
will tax the same tax base, and tax revenues in country D will equal,
T nnd = n(td − tu)(1− ch) (3)
where td ∈ [0, 1] is the tax rate in country D. By contrast, if U has implemented a
tax audit system, firms will declare true costs to country U and therefore deduct
higher taxes in country D. In this case tax revenues will equal,
T nad = n(td − tu)(1− ch)− ntu(ch − c¯) (4)
In the absence of audit, firms hide part of their revenues and therefore evade an
amount of taxes equal to ntd(ch − c).
9see European Court of Justice, decision 18 December 2007, case C-101/05, A.
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Without an audit system we define the global tax revenues as:
T nn = T nnu + T
nn
d = ntd(1− ch) (5)
In the presence of audit, the global tax revenues is:
T na = T nau + T
na
d = ntd(1− ch)−M(n) (6)
Global tax revenues are decreasing in audit cost M(n). A developed country
therefore has no incentive to support auditing in the developing economy. They
are a function of the tax rate in the developed country, but not of the tax rate in
the developing country due to the foreign tax credit. From a tax policy perspective
of the developing country this may imply that whatever goal is regarded as relevant
and whatever measures can apply for tax purposes, the outcome is simply random
and impossible to be predicted in advance, thus generating a negative impact
on tax reforms that such country may want to implement for enhancing its tax
governance in compliance with international standards.
4.2 A Treaty
Tax treaties with developing countries typically follow the UN model tax treaty,
where countries agree to exchange information and eliminate double taxation by
splitting firm revenues according to the arm’s length transfer pricing rule. The
arms length principle defines the just transfer price as average production costs
plus a mark-up. We will assume that this transfer price equals αc˜i, where α > 1.
Both countries will lose part of the tax base when signing a treaty. The developed
country D could gain from a double tax treaty if this reveals true production costs
of firms. However, the developing country U would unconditionally lose from a
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tax treaty, as it could observe true production costs even in the absence of a treaty
through auditing. Developing countries will therefore only voluntarily sign tax
treaties if an element of revenue sharing is included in the treaty.
From a legal perspective there is a traditional opposition to include revenue shar-
ing in tax treaties, since ex post a contracting state is obliged to execute a treaty in
good faith according to the obligations and regardless of what this may entail. 10
Nonetheless, there are several examples that include elements of revenue sharing
in bilateral tax treaties. A good example, frequently included in Swiss tax treaties,
can be found for taxing income of frontier workers. Another example arises in the
EU directive (transitional regime) and international agreements on the taxation
of savings. A third example can be found in the Australian tax treaty practice at
the level of the memorandum of understanding that is generally annexed to tax
10This may obviously lead to the fact that a contracting state may refrain from signing a treaty
ex ante.
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treaties. 11 Accordingly we will now propose that revenue sharing is to be included
in a fair tax treaty with a developing country.
In order to obtain a voluntary agreement, the developed economy, D, will pro-
pose a compensation fee f for the revelation of information about every firm. We
11Australian tax treaties with developing countries, in particular in cases where unilateral flows
of information can arise, are generally accompanied by a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
on extraordinary and ordinary costs to provide information. The relevant provision on costs is
as follows:
Pursuant to Article X of the Agreement it is mutually decided that costs that would be incurred
in the ordinary course of administering the domestic tax laws of the requested party will be borne
by the requested party when such costs are incurred for the purpose of responding to a request
for information. Such ordinary costs will normally cover internal administration costs and any
minor external costs.
All other costs that are not ordinary costs are considered extraordinary costs and will be borne
by the requesting party. Examples of extraordinary costs include, but are not limited to, the
following:
• reasonable fees charged by third parties for carrying out research;
• reasonable fees charged by third parties for copying documents;
• reasonable costs of engaging experts, interpreters, or translators;
• reasonable costs of conveying documents to the requesting party;
• reasonable litigation costs of the requested party in relation to a specific request for infor-
mation; and
• reasonable costs for obtaining depositions or testimony.
All requests for payment must be supported by the relevant documentation, ie. an invoice/receipt
for payment.
The parties above named will consult each other in any particular case where extraordinary costs
are likely to exceed a certain threshold to determine whether the requesting party will continue
to pursue the request and bear the cost.
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assume that the developed country will offer fl if revealed costs of the firm are low
and fh if revealed costs were high.
The timing is as follows: first the developed country D chooses and announces
fh and fl
12. Then the developing country U decides whether to sign the treaty
or not. Finally, after realization of c˜i (which is not observable by the developed
country), if U signed the contract, it audits the firms, collects taxes if any and pays
η ·fh+(n−η)fl (where η ∈ [0, n] is the number of firms whose actual ci = cl) to D.
In order to induce U to sign the treaty and to give a true declaration about the
actual realization of each ci, the developed country D needs to choose the lump
sum fee vector f according to the following condition:
1. Incentive compatibility (IC) When a state piη
13 actually happened, the tax
revenues of the developing country when it declares piη must be (weakly)
greater then its tax revenues when it declares pij for all j ∈ [0, n] different
from η;14
2. Participation constraint (PC) the expected tax revenues of the developing
country when it accepts the treaty must be (weakly) greater than what it
gets when it refuses.
12So fh ≤ fl
13In this state of the world just η firms make a low revenue while the others (n− η) make the
high one.
14We firmly believe that this condition is not met in the agreements that Switzerland has
signed in 2011 with Germany and the United Kingdom on the single taxation of savings in the
country of source. Such agreements, designed to preserve anonymity of investors, give the state of
residence, which for the purpose of our article is in a similar situation to country D, no possibility
of cross-checking cases of misreporting or of loose enforcement of taxes by Switzerland.
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If we get back to the relations between countries D and U , we believe that
this structural deficiency of the potential risk of misreporting can be overcome by
using the incentive compatibility condition.
Suppose that D sets fh 6= fl, then U has an incentive to misreport the correct
transfer price in order to make an unfair profit. So, in order to satisfy the incen-
tive compatibility constraint (IC) and then give the incentive to share the correct
information to U , the developed country D has to set a unique fee f = fl = fh.
In order to satisfy the participation constraint (PC) the choice of f depends on
whether in the absence of a treaty the developing country audits or not, equation
(2). In the following we first analyze the case where condition (2) is satisfied, and
thereafter the case when it is not satisfied.
4.2.1 A treaty with audit already in place
If the tax revenue gain from auditing is (weakly) greater than audit costs (condition
(2) is satisfied), then implementing a monitoring system does not depend on the
treaty, since it will be implemented anyway. If this is the case, then the developing
country U will sign the treaty if tax revenues plus revenue sharing nf ta exceeds
tax revenues in the absence of a treaty,
T tau = ntu(α− 1)c−M(n) + nf ta ≥ T nau (7)
The previous equation is satisfied if and only if the tax revenue loss of the reduced
tax base and audit costs are (weakly) inferior to the tax revenue gain. Formally,
the participation constraint is satisfied if and only if,
f ta
u
= tu(1− αc) ≤ f ta (8)
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where f ta
u
is the minimum level of revenue sharing for which country U with an
audit system will be willing to sign the treaty.
The developed country D will sign the treaty when audit was already in place
if and only if tax revenues it receives with the treaty, T tad , are greater than tax
revenues if it does not sign,
T tad = ntd(1− αc)− nf ta ≤ n(td − tu)(1− ch)− ntu(ch − c¯) = T nad (9)
This gives the maximum fee the developed country is willing to pay,
f
ta
d = td(ch − αc) + tu(1− c¯) ≥ f ta (10)
where f
ta
d is the maximum level of revenue sharing for which country D will be
willing to sign the treaty with a developing country with an audit system.
A different conclusion can in our view only be reached when country D wants
to promote good tax governance of country U regardless of an actual return, thus
including for instance an element of aid to development, as the European Union,
currently the major financial donor in the world, does since 2009.
A treaty is therefore feasible and fiscally rewarding if and only if condition 8
and 10 are both satisfied, i.e. f ta
u
≤ f ta ≤ f tad .
4.2.2 A treaty initially without audit
If audit costs are greater than the tax revenue gain, U will not implement the
audit system in the absence of the treaty. This means that in the absence of a
treaty it will get a payoff of T nnu , defined in equation (1) above, since each firm i
will declare high costs ch, and it will get T
tn
u if it signs the treaty. The problem of
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the developing country U consists of choosing whether to sign the treaty or not in
order to maximize its tax revenues. It will accept the treaty if and only if:
T tnu = ntu(α− 1)c−M(n) + nf tn ≥ ntu(1− ch) = T nnu (11)
The previous condition is satisfied if and only if the fee plus the net tax revenues
gain are (weakly) greater than the cost of the audit system, or
f tn
u
= tu(1− αc) + M(n)
n
− tu(ch − c¯) ≤ f tn (12)
where f tn
u
is the minimum level of revenue sharing for which country U without
an audit system will be willing to sign the treaty.
This pattern is in substance linked to the recent developments concerning the
Global Forum on Fiscal Transparency. Since 2009 countries are willing to sign tax
treaties with exchange of information provisions in order not to be listed in the
groups of uncooperative tax jurisdictions and be internationally blamed for not
effectively countering tax avoidance and evasion. For such reason a developing
country may be willing to sing a tax treaty with an exchange of information clause
even when it knows that such clause will in fact not yield any advantage with re-
spect to tax revenue for it. However, we believe that the developing country, even
in such circumstances, will not effectively carry out tax audits unless it believes
that it may gain from them.
In addition to the compensation of the loss of tax base as in condition (8) above,
the developed economy must now also compensate the developing economy for the
implementation of a tax audit system, which is the last part of the above condition
(12) and replicates condition (2).
Similarly as above, the developed country D will sign the treaty when audit
was not already in place if and only if the tax revenues it receives with the treaty
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exceed tax revenues without the treaty,
T tnd = ntd(1− αc)− nf tn ≥ n(td − tu)(1− ch) = T nnd (13)
which leads to,
f
tn
d = td(ch − αc) + tu(1− ch) ≥ f tn (14)
where f
tn
d is the maximum level of revenue sharing for which country D will be
willing to sign the treaty with a developing country without an audit system.
The first term is the tax gain when a treaty is signed. The second by contrast is
the tax revenue loss due to the ceasure of taxing rights to the developing country
U . The two conditions for the developed economy, equations (10) and (14), differ
only by the amount tu(ch − c). If no audit system was in place before the treaty,
the developed country can offer a lower compensation for the developing country
U , as it can fully appropriate the higher tax revenues of the developing country U
resulting from auditing.
A treaty is feasible if and only if conditions 12 and 14 are both satisfied, i.e.
f tn
u
≤ f tn ≤ f tnd .
4.2.3 Discussion
Jointly equations (10) and (14) give the maximum level of revenue sharing still
acceptable for the developed economy D. Equations (8) and (12) define the min-
imum level of revenue sharing that the developing country U is willing to accept.
Equations (10) and (8) hold for cases where an audit system is already in place,
M(n) ≤ ntu(ch − c¯), whereas equations (14) and (12) hold otherwise.
The model implies an unambiguously positive level of revenue sharing. The com-
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pensation will therefore be the result of a bargaining process and - depending on
the bargaining power of the two parties - fall in between the minimum level of
revenue sharing required by the developing economy U and the maximum level of
revenue sharing offered by the developed country D.
We can define the difference between the maximum revenue sharing fee offered
by the developed country and the minimum revenue sharing fee requested by the
developing country when auditing is already in place as
bta = f
ta
d − f tau = td(ch − αc) + tu(α− 1)c (15)
Similarly, the difference between the maximum revenue sharing fee offered by
the developed country and the minimum revenue sharing fee requested by the
developing country when auditing is not in place is
btn = f
tn
d − f tnu = td(ch − αc) + tu(α− 1)c−M(n)/n = bta −M(n)/n (16)
We find that a tax treaty can be welfare improving for both countries if b ≥
0. Except for the unlikely case that the average arm’s length price exceeds the
maximum cost by a very large amount, we can ensure that a tax treaty is possible.
When tax rates in developed countries exceed tax rates in developing countries,
td > tu, the bargaining space is a decreasing function in the transfer price α. We
can identify the transfer price for which both countries are indifferent between
signing the treaty or not
α =
 1c(td−tu)
(
tdch − tuc
)
if M(n) ≤ ntu(ch − c) with audit system
1
c(td−tu)
(
tdch − tuc− M(n)n
)
if M(n) ≥ ntu(ch − c) without audit system
We can plot these conditions in the following graph:
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The bold line on the graph above represents at each possible cost of audit M(n)
the maximum level of the transfer price for which both countries are just willing
to sign the treaty. The intuition is that the greater the cost of auditing M(n) the
greater the developed country D share of tax base has to be (i.e. a lower α) for
the treaty to be signed. If audit costs exceed the potential minimum gain from
negotiating a treaty, M(n)/n > b ⇔ f tn
u
> f
tn
d , then no treaty will voluntarily be
signed.
Interestingly, a treaty can stimulate a developing country to introduce a tax audit
system together with a tax treaty, even if initially an audit system is too expensive
to be implemented, f
tn
d − f tau ⇔ td ≥ tu. This convenience is enhanced when ad-
ditional funds are made available by international organizations or supranational
entities, like the EU, for the specific purpose of improving the compliance with
standards of good governance and thus increase the ability of the developing coun-
try to raise sufficient revenue from taxes collected within its jurisdiction. As long
as the tax level is given the treaty acts as it increases the tax rate in U and the
tax base in D. Moreover a treaty can end the evasion phenomenon since firms will
declare truthfully. Obviously, there will be no treaty with developing countries
21
that exhibit excessive audit costs.
Summing either equations 7 and 9 or 11 and 13 yields global tax revenues with a
treaty irrespective of the initial audit decision,
T t = T tau + T
ta
d = T
tn
u + T
tn
d = ntd(1− αc) + ntu(α− 1)c−M(n) (17)
we find that T t = T na + nbta = T nn + nbtn which shows that a treaty is feasible if
and only if the total tax revenues are increasing with the treaty.
We were able to show under which conditions countries are willing to sign a tax
treaty voluntarily where they truthfully exchange information. We have been able
to prove that such treaties will only come to place if the country in need of informa-
tion is willing to share a nonzero part of these additional revenues with the other
country. We have also proven that the developing country has no convenience to
misreport information to the developed country. We were also able to show that
the conclusion of a treaty can induce the developing country to implement a tax
audit system. In the next section, we will analyze whether these conclusions hold
under the obvious possibility that firms may leave (or enter) a country that has
just signed a treaty.
5 The model economy with the decision to relo-
cate
Capital is mobile internationally, and firms can relocate their production at will
to any third country upon bearing a relocation cost k. For simplicity, we assume
that third countries levy the same tax rate tu as the developing country U under
consideration.
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5.1 No treaty
First, suppose that the developing country has neither a tax treaty nor an efficient
tax audit system. Then the firm will claim as before high costs in both countries
and be taxed according to the global income principle, yielding expected profits of
pinns = (1− c)− td(1− ch) (18)
in case it decides to stay. Profits are given by revenues (normalized to unity) minus
expected production costs c, and minus tax payments on declared profits to the
developed country D, since taxes payed in U can be deducted. Suppose, now, that
firms can move paying a reallocation cost k. The profit of a single firm in case it
decides to move to another country without audit and treaty will be
pinnn = pinns − k (19)
In the absence of a proper tax audit or a tax treaty, the foreign tax credit method
impedes firms to relocate, as profits of relocating firms (19) are weakly lower than
profits of remaining firms (18), pinnn ≤ pinns. Note that the foreign tax credit
method impedes tax competition between developing countries, as their respective
tax rates are irrelevant for the locational decision of foreign firms, equations 18)
and 19). Tax revenues in the developed and the developing country respectively
are T nnsu = ntu(1− ch) and T nnsd = n(td − tu)(1− ch).
Second, suppose now that the developing economy implements a tax audit sys-
tem, but does not communicate the findings to the developed economy due to
the lack of a treaty. If the developed country D offers tax deductions following
the foreign tax credit method, firms can deduct all the taxes payed in U . Prof-
its in the case firms do not relocate are identical to the case in the absence of
auditing (18), pinas = pinns. Profits in the case firms relocate are also identical
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to the case in the absence of auditing (19), pinan = pinnn. Firms will again decide
to remain in the developing country U given (weakly) positive moving costs, k ≥ 0.
Tax revenues in the developed country now differ since firms deduct a higher
amount of taxes. Tax revenues in the developed country equal T nasd = ntd(1 −
ch) − ntu(1 − c¯), whereas for the developing country they change to T nasu =
ntu(1− c¯)−M(n). As opposed to the case without auditing, the developed country
D will now receive lower tax revenues as firms will now deduct higher tax payments
to the developing country U of the amount tu(ch − c). The developing country
by contrast gains these tax revenues, but has to pay auditing costs of M(n). The
developing country U prefers to implement a tax audit system if T nasu ≥ T nnsu , or
M(n) ≤ ntu(ch − c¯). (20)
This means that an audit system will be implemented if the tax gain is greater
than auditing costs.
5.2 A Treaty
As in the absence of a relocation decision, we will consider a treaty with infor-
mation exchange and revenue sharing. Note that in the absence of auditing, the
developed economy will not benefit from a treaty, and will therefore not be willing
to share tax revenues. This case is therefore identical to the no treaty/no audit
case above.
With the conclusion of a tax treaty, firms are now aware that information about
their true cost structure will be shared with the developed economy. By contrast,
a treaty eliminates double taxation according to the worldwide income taxation
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principle with foreign tax credit15, and firms will now declare part of their prof-
its in the developing country U , which might offer lower tax rates. If the prior
effect dominates, firms can expect to pay higher taxes and may consider relocation.
In order to prevent capital flight, the developing country U may consider the
possibility to pay a subsidy, s, in order to induce firms to stay. We can think of
these subsidies either as a reduction in the tax rate offered to firms considering
relocation, where the effective tax rate will be τu = tu − s/(αc¯ − c¯), or a transfer
in kind (e.g. infrastructure), which would reduce production costs. In either case,
the subsidy given is a form of tax competition. 16 Profits in case the firm leaves
are given by equation (19) above, whereas if the firm remains they are given by
pitas = (1− c¯)− tu(α− 1)c¯− td(1− αc¯) + s (21)
The optimal subsidy to firms from the perspective of the developing country U
now equals
s ≥ tu(α− 1)c¯+ td(ch − αc¯)− k (22)
The first part represents taxes payed in U , whereas the second term controls for
taxes evaded in D in the absence of a treaty, and the last part is the moving
cost. Firms can therefore claim all taxes paid to the developing country U short
of relocation costs k, and will receive the additional taxes paid to the developed
country D back from the developing country through the subsidy s. With very high
15Considering that tax treaties generally apply the ordinary tax credit method, this is possible
only to the extent that taxes, as it is often the case levied by the developing country (usually
the country of source) are lower than those levied by the developed country.
16However, in several parts of the world this option remains merely theoretical, since some
legal obstacles may prevent its implementation. This is certainly the case of the European
Union, where this type of incentives is in principle incompatible with the provision of state aids
and needs an explicit ex-ante approval by the European Commission in order to lawfully apply.
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relocation costs, this subsidy could in theory by negative, and developing countries
could in principle appropriate these locational rents. Substituting subsidies from
above, we find that tax revenues will equal
T tasu = nf
tas
u
+ nk − ntd(ch − αc¯)−M(n) (23)
Note that tax revenues depend on tax rates in the developed economy due to the
subsidy. The developed economy will receive revenues equal to
T tasd = ntd(1− αc¯)− nf
tas
d (24)
5.3 Discussion
Once again, we have to distinguish two cases indicated by condition (20), whether
audit is already in place before signing the treaty, M(n) ≤ ntu(ch− c¯), or not. On
the one hand, if audit was already in place before signing the treaty, the developing
country will accept the treaty if and only if tax revenues under a treaty exceed tax
revenues without a treaty, T tasu ≥ T nasu or
f tas
u
≥ td(ch − αc) + tu(1− c¯)− k
The developed country will accept the treaty if and only if tax revenues under a
treaty exceed tax revenues without a treaty, T tasd ≥ T nasd or
f
tas
d ≤ td(ch − αc) + tu(1− c¯)
Note that f tas
u
= f
tas
d − k. Hence the developed country D will be willing to
offer a revenue sharing fee that will exceed the revenue sharing fee requested by
the developing country U for any nonnegative relocation costs k ≥ 0. The treaty
surplus b that was generated in the absence of firm relocation is now entirely
absorbed by firms through subsidies, where applicable. By contrast, the relocation
costs k generate a different rent that opens a new bargaining space k. Let us define
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global taxation as the sum of both countries’ tax revenues: T nas = T nasd + T
nas
u =
ntd(1− ch)−M(n) is the global taxation if no treaty is signed and T tas = T tasd +
T tasu = ntd(1− ch) + nk −M(n). So:
T tas ≥ T nas → k > 0
This means that the global taxation is increasing in the treaty if and only if there
exists a positive cost for each firm to move.
On the other hand, if auditing was initially not in place and condition (20) was
not satisfied, M(n) ≥ ntu(ch − c¯), the developing country will accept the treaty
if and only if tax revenues under a treaty exceed tax revenues without a treaty,
T tnsu = T
tas
u ≥ T nnsu or
f tns
u
≥ td(ch − αc) + tu(1− ch) +M(n)/n− k
The developed country by contrast will accept the treaty if and only if tax revenues
under a treaty exceed tax revenues without a treaty, T tnsd = T
tas
d ≥ T nasd or
f
tns
d ≤ td(ch − αc) + tu(1− ch)
The minimum revenue sharing fee acceptable for the developing country will be
lower than the maximum revenue sharing fee offered by the developed country if
M(n) ≤ nk − ntd(1− ch)
Together with condition (20), This identifies the space were a treaty is feasible
even if there was no auditing initially, namely when relocation costs are high, or
k ≥ td(1− ch) + tu(ch − c¯)
As before global taxation in the absence of a tax treaty equals T nns = T nnsd +T
nns
u =
ntd(1 − ch) and T tns = T tnsd + T tnsu = ntd(1 − ch) + nk −M(n) under a treaty.
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Global tax revenues under a treaty are larger if relocation costs exceed auditing
costs, or
T tas ≥ T nas → nk > M(n)
This means that global taxation is increasing with the treaty if and only if the cost
for each firm to move is greater than the cost for the developing country to audit it.
Note that for the usual case that tax rates in the developed economy exceed-
ing tax rates in the developing economy, td > tu, the subsidy is increasing in the
arm’s length pricing mark-up α. Developing countries need not pay a subsidy if
the mark-up is defined according to
α =
tdch − tuc− k
(td − tu)c
Substituting the minimum subsidy feasible from equation (22) into the profit func-
tion (21), we find that net profits will equal pitas = (1− c¯)−td(1−ch)−k. Together,
the developed and the developing country can levy at most the developed countries
tax rate on the minimum declarable taxbase 1− ch and skim off relocation costs.
(Tax) revenues in the developing economy will consist of profit taxation of firms,
revenue sharing from the developed country, minus subsidies to firms and audit
costs.
6 Conclusions
This paper has departed from the observation that worldwide income taxation in
the country of residence is a global legal dogma of international taxation. We have
questioned this dogma from the perspective of relations with developing countries
from a legal and economic perspective, and made a modern and fair proposal for
tax treaties. We have supported a new vision of how taxing rights should be al-
located in a treaty between a developed and a developing country. We argue that
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developed countries should share tax revenues with developing countries, as this
is mutually beneficial. Developing countries will receive revenues, and developed
countries obtain information on its tax subjects through voluntary exchange of in-
formation. Our proposal for a new allocation of taxing powers reflects inter-state
fairness that should secure consistency with international tax justice goals and
achieve and objective standard of splitting taxing powers on cross-border income
in compliance with internationally accepted standards, such as the arm’s length
principle. We have shown under which conditions a developing and a developed
country will voluntarily sign a tax treaty where information is exchanged truthfully
and when they should share revenues. Moreover, we have demonstrated how the
conclusion of a tax treaty can assist in the implementation of a tax audit system.
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